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Abstract 
 
In multilevel security there is a hierarchy of users or user-levels, in which each user has its own version of 
information. Most of the existing multilevel secure (MLS) data models support u-polyinstantiation. The only 
model that supports key-polyinstantiation was proposed by Gadia et al[GS1998, JS1990, CG1995], but work on 
it remains incomplete. It is important for a model to support key-polyinstantiation because in the real world it is 
often the case that an object varies in its key value(s) (such as name, SSN, identification number etc.) when it 
occurs in the beliefs of different users. Thus having a unique key across beliefs limits our ability to accurately 
model the real world. Our work focuses on the relational database model, supports key-polyinstantiation and has 
semantics defined in an SQL-like format since most database users are experienced in using SQL and hence such 
semantics are intuitive and easy to understand.  
 
1. Introduction: 
 
In multilevel security there is a hierarchy of users or user-levels1, in which each user has its own 
version of information. A user can see all the information belonging to itself and to users below his 
level. On the other hand, information belonging to a higher user, or even existence of such information 
or such user-levels, is hidden from lower user-levels. A model for a multilevel security database must 
be devoid of covert channels that can compromise of user confidentiality. 
 
Most of the existing multilevel secure (MLS) data models support u-polyinstantiation2 [JS1990, 
JS1991, PMP1994, SC1998, SW1992, WSQ1994]. These have been defined for relational databases 
and have semantics very similar to SQL. They also have the potential to be implemented in SQL, 
although no such implementation appears to have been carried out3. 
 
The only model that supports key-polyinstantiation4 was proposed by [CG1995, GS1998]. This model 
also supports the relational model, but work on it remains incomplete – no operational semantics or 
implementation have been specified. 
 
It is important for a model to support key-polyinstantiation because in the real world it is often the 
case [GS1998] that an object varies in its key value (s) (such as name, SSN, identification number etc.) 
                                                          
1
 We use both terms user and user-level interchangeably in this paper when the meaning is apparent 
from the context. 
2
 Under u-polyinstantiation it is assumed that a real world object has the same key under beliefs of all 
users that can access the object, although non-key values may vary. 
3
 SeaView has an implementation but we did not review since these works are advancements on 
SeaView. 
4
 Key-polyinstantiation allows key as well as non-key attributes to vary across user beliefs. 
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when it occurs in the beliefs of different users. Thus having a unique key across beliefs limits our 
ability to accurately model the real world. 
 
Our work focuses on the relational database model and we hope to extend it to other database types 
(spatial, temporal etc.) over time. 
 
We also see merit in having operational semantics defined in an SQL-like format since most database 
users are experienced in using SQL and hence such semantics are intuitive and easy to understand. 
 
These factors motivated this research effort and our objective was – ‘To define a model for a multi-
level secure relational database that supports key polyinstantiation and whose statements have 
semantics closely resembling SQL’.  
 
Our model – we call it MLS-K- supports various integrity constraints and we believe that our SQL-
like statements can be easily implemented using SQL constructs5.  
 
In the following section we summarize exiting research and highlight some of the issues that current 
models fail to address. In section 3, we define our MLS-K model – its semantics, interpretation, 
satisfiability of key-polyinstantiation and its integrity constraints. This is followed by the syntax and 
semantics of the four basic SOL-like queries – SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE and DELETE. In section 
4 we briefly comment on the model evaluation. Then we conclude with a summary of our model and 
areas for future work and cite references. 
 
2. Related Work: 
 
Most of the existing MLS data models support only u-polyinstantiation [JS1990, JS1991, PMP1994, 
SC1998, SW1992, WSQ1994]. These have been defined for relational databases and have semantics 
similar to SQL. They support various integrity constraints and ensure enforcement of the ‘read-down 
and write up’ policy.  They also have the potential to be implemented in SQL, although no such 
implementation appears to have been carried out. 
 
The only known model that supports key-polyinstantiation was proposed by [CG1995, GS1998]. This 
model was defined for temporal and spatial databases but it also supports the relational model and it 
was the first work to introduce the concept of anchors. But work on this model largely remains 
incomplete – no operational semantics or implementation has been specified. 
 
3. Proposed Work: 
 
In a multilevel security environment, the user-levels form a hierarchy6 where every user has 
its own object space. We assume that each object is uniquely identified by its key values in a 
given object space; although an object can have different keys when viewed in the object 
space of different users.  
 
Information available to a user consists of the following: 
1. The object space which is the user’s belief about which objects exist in the real world. 
                                                          
5
 Implementation not included in the scope of this work. 
6
 We use the alongside drawn user-level hierarchy in all our examples.  
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2. Property values of objects in the user’s object space. 
3. Knowledge of which object in user’s object space is known to a lower user, possibly 
with different identity (key) and attribute values. 
 
As an example,    believes in the existence of 2 objects – Mary and John, α believes in the 
existence of 2 objects – Inga and Tom and λ believes in the existence of 2 objects – Hari and 
Ron as shown in Figure 1.  
   
  :      Mary •                John • 
                           
 
                α:     Inga  •          Tom   • 
 
 
     λ :      Hari  •                   Ron   • 
         Figure 1. 
Now  α thinks that Tom and Hari are the same object and Ron does not exists in the real 
world. Although     believes that John is known to λ as Ron and an object Hari does not exist.  
 
The object space of each user is independent and identical in its schema7. And an upper user 
has only read access to lower users. To maintain confidentiality of information, it is important 
for the upper user to not have a write access to a lower user, and for a lower user to not have a 
read access to the upper user. Therefore, a higher user has only write access to its own belief 
data. 
 
In a model for secure databases such communication cannot be also created covertly by users 
through the facilities available in the model. In other words the model should avoid covert 
channels.  
 
The same example shown in Figure 1 may be represented in tuples in the following way: 
                                                          
7
 Thus, if a higher user wishes to add attributes to a relation schema 
that should not be visible to the lower level users, (s)he should add a  
new relation. 

 
 
α         β 
 
 
 λ 
 4 
 
what user 
sees 
beliefs  
 

 John       John              
 

 John    α Tom  
 

 John    λ Ron  
 

 Mary      Mary  
α Tom       α Tom            Other attributes 
α Tom       λ Hari  
α Inga        α Inga                        
λ Hari         λ Hari    
λ Ron          λ Ron  
Figure 2 
 
Then the first two columns represent a user who sees this particular tuple and the attributes by 
which he identify the corresponding object. The next two columns represent the user whose 
object is believed by the first user. For example, user    believes α that  α:Tom is the same 
object as    :John.  
 
3.1 Semantics:  
 
Below we capture these intuitive ideas as formal semantics of the MLS-K data model. 
 
1. The structure of the model can be represented in a form of the security hierarchy of 
users where user-levels are partially ordered in lattice8.                 
2. Each user is assigned a security classification (or classification) which defines what 
data is visible to this user9. 
3. The relation schema is:  R(OC,OO, BC,BO, A1, C1, A2, C2, …, Ak, Ck) where   
OC- owner classification is the security classification of the tuple owner. 
OO- owner object is the object key (could be multiple attributes) as believed by the 
tuple owner. 
BC- belief classification is the security classification of the relation owner. 
BO-belief object is the object key (could be multiple attributes) as believed by the 
relation owner.  
Ai –data attribute over domain Di 
Ci –classification attribute for Ai. The domain of Ci is specified by a set {Li..Hi} 
containing all security classifications ranging from Li up to Hi (Li < Hi ≤  OC). 
4. Let r denote an instance of a multilevel relation R. 
                                                          
8
 A lattice is a partial order defined on the user-levels. In our example, the partial order is    > α,    > β, 
α > λ, β > λ, and under transitive closure of this partial ordering    > λ.  So we say   is higher than α, α 
is higher than λ and β is higher than λ. Further, under transitive closure of the partial ordering,   is 
higher than λ. 
9
 We use the user-level as the security classification although this is not mandatory.  
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Then in Figure 2 columns should be labeled as follows: 
 
OC OO BC BO Ai Ci … 
 

 John       John                              
 

 John    α Tom 
 

 John    λ Ron 
 

 Mary      Mary 
α Tom       α Tom            
α Tom       λ Hari 
α Inga        α Inga                       
λ Hari         λ Hari   
λ Ron          λ Ron 
 
 
 
 
Other  
 
 
 
 
attributes 
 
Figure 3 
 
3.2 Interpretation: 
 
1. Objects are believed by δ -user10 to exist if the following equality of tuples holds,  
t[OC,OO] = t[BC,BO]. 
2. Objects are accepted if t[OC,OO] ≠ t[BC,BO]. We say δ -user believes that an object 
OO is known to BC-user as object BO. And we say that the data (attributes) of object 
BO is accepted by δ -user.  
3. Objects are not accepted by a user if they are neither believed nor accepted.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
For example, α believes that there is an object Tom in the real world, this is reflected in 
the first tuple, and this object Tom is known to λ as Hari. 
 
A user’s belief comprises of all objects that have been believed and accepted by the user. 
3.3 Key-polyinstantiation: 
 
For a given relation, the set of (OC,OO,BC,BO) values is unique and said to be a key of a 
relation. Two or more tuples could have the same BC and BO values (i.e. they are believed by 
the same user) or the same OC and OO values (i.e. they are owned by the same user) but not 
both. 
                                                          
10
 Note that δ  is not a user in our hierarchy and when we use this notation we mean that this property is 
valid for the current user who could be at any level in the hierarchy i.e. δ  can be   , α, β or λ as needed.  
OC OO BC BO 
α Tom       α Tom            
α Tom       λ Hari   
λ Hari λ Hari 
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3.4 Integrity Properties: 
 
1. Entity Integrity: 
a) t[OC] ≠ null and t[BC] ≠ null and t[BO] ≠ null i.e. no attribute of the key can 
be null except OO. 
b) If t[OO] contains more than one data attribute then all of them have the same 
classification t[OC]11. 
c) If t[BO] contains more than one data attribute then all of them have the same 
t[BC]. 
d) Any other attribute Ai or Ci can take any value from its respective domain or it 
can take a null value.  
2. Null Values: 
a) t[OO] = null means that the tuple was inserted by lower user and the current 
user is expected to accept or reject these data. For example,  
 
  : null        α: Aaron 
α: Aaron      α: Aaron 
Figure 5 
 
 If user α introduced a new object ‘Aaron’, since    > α the data was 
automatically inserted to    level. However,    has not yet decided whether to 
believe α:Aaron or not. 
b) t[Ai] = null means that the user has not inserted a value for this particular 
attribute and t[Ci] = null means that the tuple was deleted by the owner of this 
value, so there existed t’∈r,  t’[OC]= t[Ci]. This is of significance only for 
borrowed data.  
 
3. Data Borrow Integrity: An instance r of a multilevel relation R satisfies the data-borrow 
integrity iff ∀t∈r  and 1≤ i ≤ n,    
a) If ∀Ci  t[Ci] ≤ t[BC], which means that all data in particular relation must 
either belong to the δ -user or be borrowed from the lower level users. 
b) If t[BC,BO] ≠ t[OC,OO] then ∃t’∈r such that t[BC,BO] = t’[OC,OO] = 
t’[BC,BO] and ∀Ai, Ci  t[Ai, Ci] = t’[Ai, Ci]. In other words if an object was 
accepted by δ -user then this object must exist on some lower level and must be 
believed by the lower level user.  
c) If t[Ai] ≠ null ∧ t[Ci] < t[BC] ≤ t[OC], then ∃t’∈r such that t[BC,BO] = 
t’[OC,OO]  ∧ t[Ci] = t’[BC] ∧ t [Ai, Ci] = t’[Ai, Ci]. A user cannot borrow 
attributes from the object whose existence it does not accept. 
                                                          
11
 We have kept OO and BO as single attributes in our examples for ease of understanding but this is 
not mandatory. 
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Figure 6 
 
For example, α believes that object known as Tom to him is the same as the object known as Hari to λ 
and α chooses to borrow attribute values for his belief Tom from λ’s belief of Hari. This is indicated 
by Csalary value being λ. However, α does not accept λ’s belief of  Ron and hence cannot borrow any 
attributes from Ron.  
 
4. Referential Integrity: Let FK1 be the foreign key of the referencing relation R1 with key 
K1. Let R2 be the referenced relation with key K2. An instance r1∈R1 and r2∈R2 satisfy 
referential integrity iff: 
a) ∀t11∈r1, t11[K1] ≠ null then ∃t21∈r2 such that t11[K1] = t22[K2] ∧  t11[BC] = 
t21[BC] ∧ t11[BC] ≥ t21[BC],  and 
b) ∀t11, t12∈r1 and ∀t21,t22∈r2, if t11[K1] = t12[K1]  ∧  t11[BC] = t21[BC] ∧ t12[BC] = 
t22[BC] = t11[BC]  ∧  t11[K1] = t21[K2] = t22[K2] ⇒ t21[K1] = t22[K2].   
 
3.5 SQL-like Statements: 
 
In this section we present out SQL-like statements for SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE and 
DELETE. 
 
3.5.1 The Select Statement 
 
The select statement executed by a δ -user has the following general form12: 
 SELECT B1 [, B2] … 
FROM R1 [, R2] … 
[WHERE p] 
[RESTRICTED TO q ] 
 
Symbol Explanation –  
R1,R2, … are relation names.  
B1, B2, … are data or classification attributes or any of the key values: OC, OO, BC, BO or 
wildcard (*). 
p is a predicate expression that may include conditions involving data attributes, classification 
attributes, OC, OO, BC, BO values or a wildcard (*) that may concern all levels lower than 
or equal to δ . p can also include an embedded SELECT statement as in example 2.  
q is a predicate expression used to specify the level(s) in the hierarchy that the selections 
should be restricted to (e.g. if a δ -user wants to specify ‘search all beliefs at all levels below 
                                                          
12
 [ ] implies that the expression within [ ] is optional. This notation holds for all statements.  
OC OO BC BO Age
 
Cage Salary Csalary 
α Tom       α Tom            35 α 80 λ 
α Tom       λ Hari   39 λ 80 λ 
λ Ron λ Ron 40 λ 54 λ 
λ Hari         λ Hari   39 λ 80 λ 
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me that are not part of my belief’ then the predicate q would be OC = * Λ  OC ≠  ‘δ ’13 and if 
a  δ -user wants to specify  ‘search beliefs of all users below me that have been accepted by 
me’ then the predicate q would be OC = ‘δ ’ ∧ BC = *).  
 
Example 1 Find all users who believe in the existence of or accept object John.  
SELECT OC 
FROM  R 
WHERE  OO = ‘John’ V BO = ‘John’ 
 
Example 2 Find object names believed by me (δ -user) but not by users at any level below me. 
SELECT BO 
FROM  R 
WHERE  OO = BO Λ  BO = * Λ  BC NOT IN ( SELECT  BC 
                                                                FROM R 
                  WHERE OO = BO Λ  BO = * 
             RESTRICTED_TO OC = * Λ  OC ≠  δ ) 
 
Select operation evaluates only tuples having t[OC] = t[BC] = δ  unless there is 
RESTRICTED_TO clause. If there is more than one relation included in the FROM clause, 
the predicate p is implicitly substituted by p ∧ (R1.OC = R2. OC = …). For tuples t satisfying 
p, the data of t for the attributes listed in the SELECT clause are included in the result. A 
SELECT statement is assumed to always succeed, although the returned tuple may be an 
empty set. 
 
Replacing p with p ∧ (R1.OC = R2. OC = …) serves to enforce that δ -tuples in one relation 
only join with δ -tuples in other relations. This is based on the idea that a δ -tuple contains all 
the data accepted by δ -users, and therefore should only be joined with other δ -tuples. 
Otherwise, it is difficult to interpret the returned results.  
 
 
3.5.2 The Insert Statement 
 
The insert statement executed by a δ -user has the following general form: 
INSERT 
INTO R ( OO, Aj1 [, Aj2] … )   
VALUES (oo, aj1 [, aj2] …) 
 
Symbol Explanation –  
R is a relation name;  
OO is the object belonging to user requesting insertion owner;  
Aj1, Aj2, … are data attribute names in R;  
oo, aj1 [, aj2] … are the data values for OO, Aj1 [, Aj2] …respectively satisfying relevant 
domain constraints. One or more aji could also be an embedded select statement in cases 
when data borrowing is needed14. 
                                                          
13
 OC ≠  ‘ δ ’ can also be interpreted as ¬ OC = ‘ δ ’ 
14
 If all aji values are embedded statements, this could imply that more than one tuple is being 
simultaneously inserted and this may cause a violation of the key-polyinstantiation integrity.  
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Each INSERT data manipulation can insert at-most one tuple into the relation R. The inserted 
tuple t is constructed as follows: 
For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 
1. The value OO (object name) must be specified in the attribute list of the INTO clause 
and value oo is in the attribute list of the VALUES clause otherwise data manipulation 
is rejected. 
2. t[OO] = t[BO] = oo and  t[OC] = t[BC] = ‘δ ’ which means that  the inserted tuple is 
believed by the δ -user. 
3. If Ai is in the attribute list of the INTO clause and ai is in the attribute list of the 
VALUES clause then, t[Ai] = (ai), else t[Ai] = (null) which means that if the value of an 
attribute Ai is not specified in VALUES clause value of Ai is set to be null. 
4. All Ci values are automatically set equal to ‘δ ’ unless embedded SELECT statement 
specifying this value is used. If not, a δ -user can set a desired value for a Ci, 
classification attribute, using the UPDATE command after the tuple has been inserted. 
  
Example 3 User    wants to insert the new object Mary, borrowing the age value from object 
Hari in which λ believes. 
 
INSERT  
INTO R (*)                                        
VALUES (‘Mary’, (SELECT R.AGE 
                                 FROM R 
                                 WHERE OC = λ Λ  OO = ‘Hari’), 80) 
 
The resulting relation is15:  
 
 
 
 
The insertion is permitted only if all integrity constraints are satisfied and there is no t’ Є  r 
such that t’ [OC, OO, BC, BO] = t[δ , oo, δ , bo]. If so, the insertion tuple is rejected and data 
manipulation is rejected and the original database state is left unchanged. This rejection does 
not open a covert channel since a tuple causing this rejection is already visible to the δ -user. 
 
When the tuple is inserted into the belief of the δ -user, it is automatically inserted into the 
beliefs of all users above δ  such that for t’∈all users above δ  ∀Ai, Ci  t[Ai, Ci] = t’[Ai, Ci] and 
value t’[OO] = null (until the higher user accepts this tuple by changing the OO value by 
using an UPDATE command). 
 
3.5.3 The Update Statement 
 
The update statement executed by a δ -user has the following general form: 
UPDATE R 
SET [OO = oo], [BO = bo] , [Aj1 = aj1],  [Cj1 = cj1] [, Aj2 =  aj2, Cj2 = cj2] …  
                                                          
15
 In all our examples we show the tuples that are directly related to the operation being illustrated in the 
example which is actually a subset of the actual belief of the user.  
OC OO BC BO Age
 
Cage Salary Csalary 
 
 
 
Mary       
 
Mary            39 λ 80     
λ Hari         λ Hari   39 λ 47 λ 
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[WHERE p] 
 
Symbol Explanation –  
R is a relation name; OO is the owner object; BO is the belief object.  
Aj1, Aj2, … are data attribute names in R; Cj1, Cj2, … are classification attribute names in R;  
oo, bo, aj1 [, aj2] … are the data values for OO, BO, Aj1, Cj1 [, Aj2, Cj2] …respectively       
satisfying relevant domain constraints. Not all these pairs have to be present in SET clause.  
p is a predicate expression that may include conditions involving data attributes, classification 
attributes, OO, BO, BC values or an embedded SQL statement. 
 
Only those tuples t Є  r that have t[OC] = δ  are taken into consideration when UPDATE 
operation is evaluated. For tuples t Є  r that satisfy the predicate p, r is updated as follows:    
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 
1. t[OO] = oo  
2. t[BO] = bo 
3. t[Ai] = ai 
4. t[Ci] = ci 
 
The update is permitted only if all integrity constraints are satisfied and there is no t’ Є  r such 
that t’ [OC, OO, BC, BO] =  t[δ , oo, bc, bo]. If so, the tuple is rejected and data manipulation 
is rejected and the original database state is left unchanged. 
 
Example 4 User    accepts the object Jane that was inserted by λ. 
UPDATE R 
SET OO = ‘Aaron’ 
WHERE OO = null Λ  BC = λ Λ  BO = ‘Jane’ 
 
 a) 
 
 
 
 b) 
 
 
Figure 7 a) relation before update   b) the resulting relation after update 
 
Example 5 User    updates the object Jane that was inserted by λ. 
UPDATE R 
SET OO = ‘Aaron’, Salary = 80 
WHERE OO = null Λ  BC = λ Λ  BO = ‘Jane’ 
 
 
 a) 
 
 
 
OC OO BC BO Age
 
Cage Salary Csalary 
 
 
 
null      λ Jane            39 λ 47 λ 
λ Jane            λ Jane            39 λ 47 λ 
OC OO BC BO Age
 
Cage Salary Csalary 
 
 
 
Aaron λ Jane            39 λ 47 λ 
λ Jane            λ Jane            39 λ 47 λ 
OC OO BC BO Age
 
Cage Salary Csalary 
 
 
 
null      λ Jane            39 λ 47 λ 
λ Jane      λ Jane 39 λ 47 λ 
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 b) 
 
 
Figure 8 a) relation before update   b) the resulting relation after update 
 
 
3.5.4 The Delete Statement 
 
The delete statement executed by a δ -user has the following general form: 
 DELETE 
FROM R 
[WHERE p] 
 
Symbol Explanation –  
r is the relation name.  
p is a predicate expression that may include conditions involving data attributes, classification 
attributes, OO, BO, BC values or an embedded statement.  
 
Only those tuples t Є  r that have t[OC] = δ  are considered in the evaluation of DELETE 
operation, i.e. predicate expression is effectively changed to p Λ  t[OC] = δ . For those tuples t 
Є  r that are selected, r is changed as follows: 
1. If t[OC,OO] = t[BC,BO] which indicates that the object to delete is a belief object and 
this object or its attributes might be borrowed by some upper level users. Then tuple can 
be deleted. And the next step would be to check if there exists a tuple t’ belonging to a 
user δ ’ (δ ’ > δ ) that borrowed elements from the tuple t, if so then in δ ’s belief, all 
corresponding Ci
 
values should be set to null. In other words, ∃t’∈r such that t’[BC,BO] 
≠  t’[OC,OO] Λ  t’[BC,BO] = t[OC,OO], then ∀t’ t’[Ci] = null. 
2. If t[OC,OO] ≠  t[BC,BO] which means that the object to delete was accepted by δ -user 
and neither this object or its attributes can be borrowed by other users by data-borrowing 
properties and requested relation can be safely deleted from the database.
OC OO BC BO Age
 
Cage Salary Csalary 
 
 
 
Aaron λ Jane            39 λ 80    
λ Jane      λ Jane 39 λ 47 λ 
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Example 6 User    does not accept the object Jane that was inserted by λ. 
DELETE  
FROM  R 
WHERE OO = null Λ  BC = λ Λ  BO = ‘Jane’ 
 
 a) 
 
 
 
 b) 
 
 
Figure 9 a) relation before delete   b) the resulting relation after delete 
 
Example 7 User λ deletes the object Jane which belongs to him.  
DELETE  
FROM  R 
WHERE OO = BO Λ  BO = ‘Jane’ 
  
 
 a) 
 
 
 
   b) 
 
 
Figure 10 a) relation before delete   b) the resulting relation after delete 
 
 
OC OO BC BO Age
 
Cage Salary Csalary 
 
 
 
null      λ Jane            39 λ 47 λ 
λ Jane λ Jane 39 λ 47 λ 
OC OO BC BO Age
 
Cage Salary Csalary 
λ Jane λ Jane 39 λ 47 λ 
OC OO BC BO Age
 
Cage Salary Csalary 
 
 
 
Aaron λ Jane            39 λ 80     
λ Jane λ Jane 39 λ 47 λ 
OC OO BC BO Age
 
Cage Salary Csalary 
 
 
 
Aaron λ Jane            39 null 80 
 
 
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4. Performance Evaluation: 
 
Since this is the first work that defines a MLS data model for a relational supporting key-
polyinstantiation, we have no benchmark for a performance evaluation. Further, our effort till 
date has been concentrated on defining the model and the semantics for its manipulation; and 
without an implementation of the constructs, it is impossible to measure performance using 
metrics like performance time, throughput etc. Our focus has been on accuracy and 
representation and not on performance optimization.   
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5. Conclusion and Future Work: 
 
In this paper, we defined a MLS data model with key-polyinstantiation that is sound, 
complete and free of downward information flows. The integrity properties - entity, null 
values, data borrow and referential integrity - strongly support the fact that our model is 
secure, unambiguous and that it is a powerful data model. 
 
In our model, a subject can not only ‘read down’ i.e. get data accepted by itself and by 
subjects at levels below it; but also do some kind of ‘write up’- i.e. change the data accepted 
by subjects at levels above it, provided that the data is owned by itself. 
 
Our statements very closely resemble SQL and it is our belief that it should be possible to 
implement them in SQL with reasonable ease.  
 
Our model also supports key-polyinstantiation which is essential for an accurate 
representation of the real world. 
 
Future work would include semantics for the creation and modification of the user hierarchy 
lattice, creation, modification and deletion of relations and more advanced manipulation 
operations such as joins etc. Implementation of this model using SQL is another interesting 
open topic. 
 
Another avenue for future work would be to extend the model to other databases - temporal, 
spatial, object-oriented etc. and within these frameworks to evaluate functional dependencies 
and their implications.  
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